The derivation of Bell inequalities for beables by Morgan, Peter
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
00
09
08
7v
5 
 1
7 
Ju
l 2
00
3
The derivation of Bell inequalities for beables
Peter Morgan
30, Shelley Road, Oxford, OX4 3EB, England.∗
(Dated: November 1, 2018)
Abstract
The derivation of Bell inequalities for beables is well-known to require a “no-conspiracy” assump-
tion. This assumption is widely accepted, the alternative being correlations between instrument
settings and hidden beables. Two further assumptions are identified here: (1) a “no-contextuality”
assumption, similar to the prohibition of contextuality that is required to derive the Kochen-Specker
theorem, which is closely related to the “no-conspiracy” assumption; (2) a “no-correlation” assump-
tion, which prohibits correlations between hidden beables. The three assumptions together are less
acceptable than the “no-conspiracy” assumption alone.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I take it that the violation of Bell inequalities by experiment rules out any simple local
beables model for the violation of Bell inequalities that is constructed using the resources of
classical particle mechanics (although conceptually extravagant notions of backward causal
propagation, for example, are not ruled out, and detector efficiency remains an issue), but I
consider here the violation of Bell inequalities in local beables models that are constructed
using the resources of classical statistical field theory. Nonlocal correlations are always
present in the context of classical statistical field theory, whereas they are generally not
present in the classical mechanics of a small number of particles.
There are other reasons for thinking that beables models must be nonlocal, particularly
Hegerfeldt nonlocality[1, 2], but Bell inequalities for beables do not provide a strong con-
straint on classical statistical fields as a basis for a beables model for the violation of Bell
inequalities.
Bell[3, Chap. 7, originally 1976] shows from a definition of local causality alone that a
beables model predicts two Bell inequalities for observable classical statistics associated with
two space-like separated regions RA and RB, and that quantum theory does not satisfy the
same inequalities. Shimony, Horne, and Clauser[4, originally 1976] show, however, that if
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FIG. 1: Space-time regions and their beables.
beables associated with Past(RA)−Past(RB) and with Past(RB)−Past(RA) are correlated
with hidden beables associated with Past(RA) ∩ Past(RB), which we cannot rule out on
causal grounds because the forward light cone of Past(RA)∩Past(RB) fills all of space-time,
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then the beables model need not satisfy the Bell inequalities. Bell[3, Chap. 12, originally
1977] admits this, but finds that hidden beables associated with Past(RA)∩Past(RB) have to
be correlated with instrument settings in RA and in RB. Arguing that such a requirement
is unreasonable, Bell calls it a “conspiracy”. Bell’s argument and Shimony, Horne, and
Clauser’s comments are brought together in a review article by d’Espagnat[5], and Brans[6]
gives an alternative, quite helpful discussion. The literature on Bell inequalities for beables is
quite sparse (very sparse indeed by comparison with the literature on Bell inequalities more
generally), and has not changed the general perception that Bell[3, Chap. 12] more-or-less
closes the discussion.
The beables (a, λ), (b, µ), and (c, ν) are associated with the disjoint regions Past(RA)−
Past(RB), Past(RB) − Past(RA), and Past(RA) ∩ Past(RB), respectively (see figure 1).
a, b, and c are “non-hidden”[3, Chap. 12] beables, instrument settings that are observed
and possibly controlled by the experimenter, while λ, µ, and ν are hidden beables, neither
observed nor controlled by the experimenter. As far as classical physics is concerned, the
separation of beables into (a, λ), (b, µ), and (c, ν) is arbitrary, because anything that is
hidden today may be revealed tomorrow and whether we observe or record beables makes
no difference, so any derivation of Bell inequalities must be robust under different choices of
the separation. There is nothing about the mathematics of section II that will determine a
separation of beables into (a, λ), (b, µ), and (c, ν). The only difference between non-hidden
beables and hidden beables will be that we will integrate over all values of hidden beables
and never integrate over non-hidden beables. It will be useful to consider three choices in
this paper: (1) all of a, b, c, λ, µ, and ν non-null; (2) ν maximal, so that c is null; and (3) c
maximal, so that ν is null.
The fundamental definition in Bell’s derivation of inequalities for beables is that for a
locally causal theory, for X any beables associated with RA, X∩ all of the beables associated
with Past(RA) ∩ Past(RB), Xp some of the beables associated with Past(RA)− Past(RB),
and Y any beables associated with RB, the conditional probability of X given X∩ and Xp
is statistically independent of Y ,
p(X|X∩, Xp, Y ) = p(X|X∩, Xp). (1)
(In an alternative terminology, usual in philosophy, correlation between X and Y is “screened
off” by X∩ and Xp.) This definition is applied a number of times in Bell’s derivation of
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inequalities for beables. Shimony, Horne, and Clauser[4], in contrast, weaken the definition of
a locally causal theory, so that forX and Y as above, but forXP all of the beables associated
with Past(RA), the conditional probability of X given XP is statistically independent of Y ,
p(X|XP , Y ) = p(X|XP ). (2)
(Correlation between X and Y is “screened off” by XP .) The two definitions are the same
if Xp happens to be a specification of all the beables in Past(RA)−Past(RB). Equation (1)
combines equation (2), which is a more natural definition of local causality, with a principle
that correlations only arise because of common causes. Equation (2), however, is not strong
enough to allow Bell inequalities to be derived. Some of the applications of equation (1) can
be replaced by applications of equation (2), but most cannot. One of the latter applications
is the “no-conspiracy” assumption, which prohibits correlations between instrument settings
and hidden beables, and section II further identifies a “no-correlation” assumption (discussed
in section IV), which prohibits correlations between hidden beables.
The derivation of Bell inequalities for beables also requires a previously unidentified as-
sumption that a beables theory is noncontextual. Section II identifies a “no-contextuality”
assumption (discussed in section III), similar to the prohibition of contextuality that is
required of a beables model to derive the Kochen-Specker theorem[7], and shows the “no-
contextuality” assumption to be closely related to the “no-conspiracy” assumption. The
three assumptions taken together are much less acceptable than the “no-conspiracy” as-
sumption alone.
Finally, section V shows that the violation of Bell inequalities alone does not justify
preferring an empiricist interpretation of quantum field theory over an equally empiricist
interpretation of classical statistical field theory by considering the similarities between a
quantum field theoretic Wigner quasi-probability description and a classical probability de-
scription of an experiment that violates a Bell inequality.
II. DERIVATION OF BELL INEQUALITIES FOR BEABLES
Bell’s mathematical argument is reproduced here in the form given by d’Espagnat[5].
[[Notes in brackets]] will indicate where there are assumptions that will be addressed in the
next two sections. Suppose that A and B are observed in regions RA and RB. Applying
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equation (1) or equation (2), the conditional probability density p(A|a, b, c, λ, µ, ν, B) is
statistically independent of b, µ, and B in a locally causal theory, and similarly for the
conditional probability density p(B|a, b, c, λ, µ, ν, A),
p(A|a, b, c, λ, µ, ν, B) = p(A|a, c, λ, ν), (3)
p(B|a, b, c, λ, µ, ν, A) = p(B|b, c, µ, ν). (4)
The mean of the product AB, given the non-hidden beables (a, b, c), is:
M(a, b, c) =
∫∫∫ ∑
AB
AB p(A,B, λ, µ, ν|a, b, c)dλdµdν
=
∫∫∫ ∑
AB
AB p(A|a, c, λ, ν)p(B|b, c, µ, ν)p(λ, µ, ν|a, b, c)dλdµdν, (5)
where the conditional probability density p(λ, µ, ν|a, b, c) for the hidden beables can be
rewritten, applying no more than the definition of conditional probability, as
p(λ, µ, ν|a, b, c) = p(λ|µ, ν, a, b, c)p(µ, ν|a, b, c)
= p(λ|µ, ν, a, b, c)p(µ|ν, a, b, c)p(ν|a, b, c). (6)
Applying equation (1), or, through a putative argument provided by Shimony, Horne, and
Clauser[4] and discussed in section IV, applying equation (2), we can derive
p(λ|µ, ν, a, b, c) = p(λ|ν, a, b, c), (7)
p(λ|ν, a, b, c) = p(λ|ν, a, c), (8)
p(µ|ν, a, b, c) = p(µ|ν, b, c) (9)
[[p(λ|µ, ν, a, b, c) = p(λ|ν, a, b, c) is the “no-correlation” assumption; equations (8) and (9)
are further assumptions, which might be called “no-nonlocal-conspiracy” assumptions, but
will not be directly addressed here]], so the mean of the product AB, given non-hidden
beables (a, b, c), is
M(a, b, c) =
∫
A(a, c, ν)B(b, c, ν)p(ν|a, b, c)dν, (10)
where A(a, c, ν) is the mean of A averaged over the hidden beables λ, given the non-hidden
beables a and c and the hidden beables ν, and similarly for B(b, c, ν).
Suppose that A and B satisfy |A| ≤ 1 and |B| ≤ 1, so that |A(a, c, ν)| ≤ 1 and
|B(b, c, ν)| ≤ 1. If we also suppose that
p(ν|a, b, c) = p(ν|c) (11)
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[[p(ν|a, b, c) = p(ν|c) is the already known “no-conspiracy” assumption]], then we can derive,
for distinct non-hidden beables a, a′, and b, b′,
|M(a, b, c)∓M(a, b′, c)| =
∣∣∣∣
∫
A(a, c, ν)
[
B(b, c, ν)∓ B(b′, c, ν)
]
p(ν|c)dν
∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣
∫ [
B(b, c, ν)∓B(b′, c, ν)
]
p(ν|c)dν
∣∣∣∣ , (12)
|M(a′, b, c)±M(a′, b′, c)| =
∣∣∣∣
∫
A(a′, c, ν)
[
B(b, c, ν)±B(b′, c, ν)
]
p(ν|c)dν
∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣
∫ [
B(b, c, ν)±B(b′, c, ν)
]
p(ν|c)dν
∣∣∣∣ , (13)
[[Being able to change a→ a′ without changing c or b and b→ b′ without changing c or a is
the “no-contextuality” assumption, so-called here because it signifies that state preparation
and measurement devices are independent]] so that
|M(a, b, c)∓M(a, b′, c)|+ |M(a′, b, c)±M(a′, b′, c)| ≤ 2. (14)
In contrast, for two spin-half particles, we can derive the inequalities
|M(a, b, c)∓M(a, b′, c)|+ |M(a′, b, c)±M(a′, b′, c)| ≤ 2
√
2, (15)
but, if p(λ|µ, ν, a, b, c) 6= p(λ|ν, a, b, c), — correlation
or p(λ|ν, a, b, c) 6= p(λ|ν, a, c), — nonlocal-conspiracy
or p(µ|ν, a, b, c) 6= p(µ|ν, b, c), — nonlocal-conspiracy
or p(ν|a, b, c) 6= p(ν|c), — conspiracy
or if we cannot change a, b, and c independently, — contextuality
then we can only derive the inequalities
|M(a, b, c)∓M(a, b′, c)|+ |M(a′, b, c)±M(a′, b′, c)| ≤ 4. (16)
Classically, non-relativistic quantum mechanics is half-way between the conditions for de-
riving Bell inequalities and the maximum violation, when equation (16) is satisfied as an
equality. There must, therefore, be principled constraints on initial conditions in a beables
model to ensure the maximum violation is never observed, as well as to allow some violation.
III. THE NO-CONSPIRACY AND NO-CONTEXTUALITY ASSUMPTIONS
The prohibition of correlations of a with c, and of b with c, the “no-contextuality” as-
sumption, is closely related to the “no-conspiracy” assumption. If we suppose that ν is
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complete information, so that c is null, we can derive in place of equation (10), supposing
that equations (7), (8), and (9) are satisfied,
M(a, b) =
∫
A(a, ν)B(b, ν)p(ν|a, b)dν, (17)
which requires that
p(ν|a, b) = p(ν) (18)
for us to be able to derive Bell inequalities. If we take a and b to be only instrument set-
tings at the time of the measurement, with c null, the “no-conspiracy” assumption is little
different than to say that instrument settings at the time of the measurement must be com-
pletely uncorrelated with the experimental apparatus (which is, after all, almost entirely in
Past(RA)∩Past(RB)). Ensuring that instrument settings are completely uncorrelated with
the experimental apparatus would seem a remarkable achievement in a classical statistical
field theory setting.
Bell argues[3, Chap. 12] that the dynamics of a mechanism to choose the instrument
settings can be made chaotic enough that, even if there are correlations between (c, ν) and
(a, b), the instrument settings may nonetheless be taken to be “at least effectively free for
the purposes at hand”. From a classical point of view, this is a remarkable claim. Either
there are correlations in a model for an experiment or there are not. Correlations that
are easy to measure at one time are generally not as easy to measure at other times, but
the practicality of measuring correlations has no bearing on whether there are correlations,
which is in principle unaffected by whether the evolution is chaotic or not.
In any case, a and b being “free for the purposes at hand” does not imply p(ν|a, b) = p(ν).
A correlation p(ν|a, b) 6= p(ν) does not “determine” a and b (or ν), but only describes a
statistical relationship between a, b, and ν.
Bell also argues[3, Chap. 12] “that the disagreement between locality and quantum me-
chanics is large — up to a factor of
√
2 in a certain sense”. The standard assumptions
discussed here are given as analytic equalities, which are unable to elaborate the “certain
sense”. Beables are so general, however, that it is unclear how no-correlation, no-nonlocal-
conspiracy, no-conspiracy, and no-contextuality could be given as physically justifiable limits
on inequality (note that the standard assumptions are problematic just as analytic equalities
between probability distributions, since such a relationship cannot be supported by exper-
imental statistics, nor, it seems, by analytic argument). Bell’s argument is also weakened
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by the classical limit being either 2 or 4 (Bell omits to mention the latter), depending on
whether we accept all the standard assumptions, with 2
√
2 as the intermediate quantum
mechanical limit.
Suppose that instead of taking ν to be complete information, we take c to be complete
information, so that ν is null. Then we can derive, in place of equation (10), again supposing
that equations (7), (8), and (9) are satisfied,
M(a, b, c) = A(a, c) B(b, c). (19)
Now to derive equation (14), we have to be able to change a→ a′ without changing c (or b)
and be able to change b→ b′ without changing c (or a), with the “no-conspiracy” assump-
tion playing no roˆle. Nonlocality aside, requiring this is the “no-contextuality” assumption.
Note that it has been argued before that Bell inequalities have little or nothing to do with
nonlocality[8], but are instead a consequence only of an assumption that quadrivariate prob-
ability distributions can be introduced for incompatible observables, which can be avoided
only by introducing contextual classical models.
In quantum field theory, the Reeh-Schlieder theorem[9] is typically thought very awkward,
yet the contextuality it implies is not taken to rule out quantum field theory. Recall that
as a consequence of the Reeh-Schlieder theorem we cannot change a quantum field state so
that the expected value of a quantum field observable associated with Past(RA)−Past(RB)
changes without changing the expected value of at least some quantum field observables
associated with both Past(RA)∩Past(RB) and Past(RB)−Past(RA). In classical statistical
terms this is just to say that we cannot generally change a → a′ without changing b and
c at least some of the time. If c is complete information about observables in Past(RA) ∩
Past(RB), this would be impossible in quantum field theory.
It is unreasonable to expect noncontextuality of a beables model when we do not expect
it of quantum field theory — to do so is to construct a straw man of a theory. If we insist
on a parallel of the Reeh-Schlieder theorem in classical statistical field theory, we cannot
derive Bell inequalities for beables.
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IV. THE NO-CORRELATION ASSUMPTION
Recall that the “no-correlation” assumption, equation (7), requires that there are no
correlations between the hidden beable λ and the hidden beables µ (that are not screened
off by ν, a, b, and c). There is no empirical way to justify this assumption, simply because it
is a condition imposed on observables that are by definition not measured. The preference
against correlations between instrument settings and hidden beables is only tendentiously
extensible to justify a prohibition against correlations between hidden beables.
Shimony, Horne, and Clauser[4] argue that
“even though the space-time region in which λ is located extends to negative
infinity in time, ν, a, c are all the beables other than λ itself in the backward light
cone of this region, and µ and b do refer to beables with space-like separation
from the λ region”
to justify deriving equations (7), (8), and (9) from equation (2). This argument is precisely
to revert to Bell’s definition of local causality, equation (1) [with X∩ = c, ν; Xp = a;
XP = c, ν, a, λ]. To try to justify equation (7), using equation (2), we could write
p(λ|c, ν, a, λ, b, µ) = p(λ|c, ν, a, λ, b), (20)
but it would be rather remarkable to depend on this equation, since p(λ|λ, Z) is trivially
equal to p(λ|λ) whatever Z represents, independently of any idea of local causality. From
the trivial equality (20) we cannot derive
p(λ|c, ν, a, b, µ) = p(λ|c, ν, a, b), (21)
which is a consequence of equation (1) but not of equation (2). If we take the trouble to
distinguish between equation (1) and equation (2) as definitions of local causality, we can
hardly argue for equations (7), (8), and (9) like this.
Shimony, Horne, and Clauser’s argument depends weakly on λ being associated with the
whole of Past(RA) − Past(RB), so that λ, ν, a, and c are all the beables in the backward
light-cone of Past(RA)−Past(RB). Let us consider, therefore, the slightly less general class
of beables models that satisfy equation (2) and for which also a probability distribution
p(at, bt, ct, λt, µt, νt) over non-hidden and hidden beables associated with a cross-section of
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Past(RA) and Past(RB) at a time t determines the equivalent probability distribution at
later times. Such a beables model includes both deterministic and indeterministic models,
and both reversible and irreversible dynamics, but does not generally satisfy equation (1). If
we suppose that the cross-section is a space-time region of finite duration ∆t, we can allow
slightly more dynamical generality than would be allowed if we supposed the cross-section
to be a hyperplane. Such a class of beables models includes almost every model we would
usually think of as classical. Bell’s construction of models in which (a, λ) is a complete set
of beables associated with all of Past(RA) is something of a novelty.
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FIG. 2: Beables associated with hyperplane slices at tM and t.
At the time tM of the measurements in RA and RB, and for a time τ∩ before the measure-
ment, there are no non-hidden beables ct or hidden beables νt. Suppose that actually ob-
served experimental statistics over (A, sA, B, sB) that violate Bell inequalities are adequately
modelled by a joint probability distribution p(A, sA, B, sB), where sA and sB are instrument
settings at time tM . Any probability distribution that has p(A, sA, B, sB) as a marginal
distribution is an adequate contextual beables model at time tM . A probability distribution
p(A, sA, B, sB) is not a quadrivariate probability distribution over incompatible observables,
as a probability distribution over (A1, A2, B1, B2) would be if it were constructed by post-
selecting values of A corresponding to different values of sA and values of B corresponding
to different values of sB, which would lead directly to Bell-type inequalities[8] without any
locality assumptions being necessary. A, sA, B, and sB are four mutually compatible ob-
servables that have to take specific values in an experiment (or in a number of experiments)
for us to be able to construct statistics corresponding to M(a, b, c), M(a, b′, c), M(a′, b, c),
and M(a′, b′, c) and hence to verify that Bell inequalities are violated by experiment.
From the starting point of p(A|λtM , atM ) and p(B|µtM , btM ), if we assume “no-correlation”
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and “no-nonlocal-conspiracy”,
p(λtM |µtM , sA, sB)= p(λtM |sA, sB)
p(λtM |sA, sB)= p(λtM |sA)
p(µtM |sA, sB)= p(µtM |sB)


−→M(sA, sB) = A(sA) B(sB).
(22)
Just “no-contextuality”, without “no-conspiracy”, proves that Bell inequalities must be sat-
isfied. It is straightforward, however, to construct a hidden beables model for p(A, sA, B, sB)
by just measuring additional observables that are compatible with A,sA,B, and sB, in an
experiment for which Bell inequalities are not satisfied. For example, we could measure de-
tails of the thermodynamical states of whatever detectors we are using, replacing A by other
classical information, from which A can be derived, or we could replace sA by measurements
of geometrical details of the apparatus that is used to achieve varied polarizations, from
which sA can be derived. Since such a hidden beables model is derived from measurements
of an apparatus in which Bell inequalities are not satisfied, at least some of the assumptions
required to derive Bell inequalities for beables must not be satisfied for such a model.
At times before tM−τ∩, the set of non-hidden beables ct and hidden beables νt is nonempty
and increases as t refers to earlier times, and presumably the assumptions come closer to
being satisfied. At earlier times, however, there is no requirement that the assumptions be
violated by much, only that the totality of correlations be such that the dynamical evolution
will result in the violation of Bell inequalities at the time of measurement, so the constraint
on a beables model is insignificant.
V. A QUANTUM FIELD THEORY APPROACH
We have become used to describing the outcome of Bell violating experiments using a
state in a complex 4-dimensional Hilbert space, in which many detailed degrees of freedom
are integrated out. If we agree, however, that non-relativistic quantum mechanics is a
reduction of quantum field theory, as we almost always do, such a state is a reduction of
a quantum field state in an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space, which gives the values of
quantum field observables associated with the regions RA and RB. If Bell inequalities are
violated by observables of a quantum field state, we would certainly attribute the violation
to the experimenters’ ingenuity in ensuring an appropriate initial quantum field state and
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making appropriate measurements. For a quantum field state describing an experiment that
violates Bell inequalities, the existence of nontrivial correlations between observables at large
space-like separations is precisely what singles out such states as special. A quantum field
state that describes experimental correlations that violate Bell inequalities at the time of
measurement describes correlations in the remote past different from those of the vacuum
state, but, as for a beables model, differences from the vacuum state may be difficult to
detect in the remote past. In quasi-probability terms, we have to set up a Wigner quasi-
distribution over phase space in the past that evolves to a Wigner quasi-distribution over
phase space at time tM that violates a Bell inequality in the regions RA and RB.
For an equilibrium state of a classical statistical field theory, correlations that violate
the assumption of statistical independence at space-like separation decrease more-or-less
exponentially fast with increasing distance, but non-trivial correlations at arbitrarily large
distances are possible for non-equilibrium states. Indeed, absolutely any correlations are
allowed in a non-equilibrium initial condition — initial conditions of low probability of course
require greater free energy to set up, but we should not forget how difficult it is to construct
an experiment that violates Bell inequalities. In a classical statistical field theory, we have
to set up a probability distribution over phase space in the past that evolves to a probability
distribution over phase space at time tM that violates a Bell inequality in the regions RA
and RB, but this is no greater “conspiracy” than is apparent in the full quantum field state
for the experiment. Hence the violation of Bell inequalities does not provide a justification
for preferring quantum theoretical description over classical theoretical description.
Since the measurements required to violate Bell inequalities experimentally require only
that we measure compatible observables (A, sA, B, sB) in a single experimental context,
the quantum field state is not fixed uniquely by observation. In particular, for a single
experimental context there is a non-empty set of quantum field states that have a positive
semi-definite Wigner distribution and are empirically adequate, and we can adopt any of
these quantum field states, or rather any of the associated positive semi-definite Wigner
distributions, as a classical model for the experiment.
The correlations we have discussed here commit us to very little. If we take an equally
empiricist approach to classical statistical field theory as we take to quantum field theory,
there just are correlations, which we don’t have to assume are caused by common (or any
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other kind of) causes. Some correlations just are. This does not preclude asking whether
we can construct a model that explains the correlations, but this can reasonably be a future
enterprise. Classical physics has always taken initial conditions to be more-or-less explained
by earlier initial conditions, with no final explanation being essential. Although of course
an explanation of why initial conditions are the way they are may well be more helpful, a
description of what the initial conditions are is a helpful enough beginning.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have first described the previously identified difference between Bell’s definition of
a locally causal theory, which insists that correlations have to be the result of common
causes, and Shimony, Horne, and Clauser’s definition, which does not. Secondly, in a signif-
icant change from both Bell’s account and Shimony, Horne, and Clauser’s account, we have
identified the “no-contextuality” assumption, which effectively extends the “no-conspiracy”
assumption far enough to make it unacceptable. Thirdly, in another significant change from
both Bell’s account and Shimony, Horne, and Clauser’s account, we have identified the
“no-correlation” assumption, which changes the type of correlations that are prohibited to
include correlations between hidden beables.
Bell accepts[3, Chapter 12, last paragraph] that “A theory may appear in which such
conspiracies inevitably occur, and these conspiracies may then seem more digestible than
the non-localities of other theories”, but concludes “But I will not myself try to make such
a theory”. For those who would construct hidden-variable models, a theory of such models
must include one or all of conspiracies, correlations, and contextuality in a principled way.
With the extra flexibility offered by denying the several assumptions identified here, it
seems more reasonable to try, at least if we allow ourselves to use the resources of classical
statistical field theory (in contrast to using only the classical mechanics of a small number
of particles, where the correlations needed are not very natural). Quantum field theory
gives us a simple and effective way to proceed, by looking for all quantum field states that
describe our knowledge of a complete experiment, and accepting only those quantum field
states that have a representation as a positive semi-definite Wigner distribution.
To temper the localism of this article, repeating the caution given in the introduction,
13
there are reasons for thinking that beables models must be nonlocal, particularly Hegerfeldt
nonlocality[1, 2], but the violation of Bell inequalities can be modelled adequately by local
beables.
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